Nuclear proliferation is in general the
spread of nuclear technology (including
nuclear power plants). The phrase is most commonly
used to specifically describe the spread of
nuclear weapons, especially from nation to nation.
The primary focus of anti-proliferation efforts is to
maintain control over the specialized materials necessary
to build such devices because this is the most dificult
and expensive part of a nuclear wepons program. (In the
Manhattan Project, 90% of the budget was dedicated to
isotope separation and enrichment). The main materials
whose generation and distribution is controlled are highly
enriched uranium and
plutonium. The scientific and technical requirements
for weapons development, although non-trivial, are
generally available in order to develop rudimentary, but
working nuclear devices. (The
Nth Country Experiment is an excellent example of
this).
The
International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguards
system under the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been an
international success. It has involved cooperation in
developing nuclear energy while ensuring that civil
uranium,
plutonium and associated plants are used only for
peaceful purposes and do not contribute in any way to
proliferation or nuclear weapons programs. In
1995 the NPT was extended indefinitely.
Most countries have renounced nuclear weapons,
recognising that possession of them would threaten rather
than enhance national security. They have therefore
embraced the NPT as a public commitment to use nuclear
materials and technology only for peaceful purposes.
The
NPT Origins And Objectives
The successful conclusion, in
1968, of negotiations on the NPT was a landmark in the
history of non-proliferation. Its indefinite extension in
May
1995 was another. At present, 187 states are party to
the NPT. These include all five declared Nuclear Weapons
States (NWSs):
China,
France, the
Russian Federation, the
UK and the
USA.
The NPT's main objectives are to stop the further
spread of nuclear weapons, to provide security for
non-nuclear weapon states which have given up the nuclear
option, to encourage international co-operation in the
peaceful uses of
nuclear energy, and to pursue negotiations in good
faith towards nuclear disarmament leading to the eventual
elimination of nuclear weapons.
The IAEA was set up by unanimous resolution of the
United Nations in
1957 to help nations develop nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes. Allied to this role is the
administration of safeguards arrangements. This provide
assurance to the international community that individual
countries are honouring their treaty commitments to use
nuclear materials and facilities exclusively for peaceful
purposes.
The IAEA therefore undertakes regular inspections of
civil nuclear facilities to verify the accuracy of
documentation supplied to it. The agency checks
inventories and undertakes sampling and analysis of
materials. Safeguards are designed to deter diversion of
nuclear material by increasing the risk of early
detection. They are complemented by controls on the export
of sensitive technology from countries such as UK and USA
through voluntary bodies such as the
Nuclear Suppliers Group[?]. The main concern of the
IAEA is that uranium not be enriched beyond what is
necessary for commercial civil plants, and that
plutonium which is produced by
nuclear reactors not be refined into a form that would
be suitable for bomb production.
Traditional safeguards are arrangements to account for
and control the use of nuclear materials. This
verification is a key element in the international system
which ensures that uranium in particular is used only for
peaceful purposes.
Parties to the NPT agree to accept technical safeguard
measures applied by the IAEA. These require that operators
of nuclear facilities maintain and declare detailed
accounting records of all movements and transactions
involving nuclear material . Over 550 facilities and
several hundred other locations are subject to regular
inspection, and their records and the nuclear material
being audited. Inspections by the IAEA are complemented by
other measures such as surveillance cameras and
instrumentation.
The aim of traditional IAEA safeguards is to deter the
diversion of nuclear material from peaceful use by
maximising the risk of early detection. At a broader level
they provide assurance to the international community that
countries are honouring their treaty commitments to use
nuclear materials and facilities exclusively for peaceful
purposes. In this way safeguards are a service both to the
international community and to individual states, who
recognise that it is in their own interest to demonstrate
compliance with these commitments.
The inspections act as an alert system providing a
warning of the possible diversion of nuclear material from
peaceful activities. The system relies on;
- Material Accountability - tracking all inward and
outward transfers and the flow of materials in any
nuclear facility. This includes sampling and analysis of
nuclear material, on-site inspections, review and
verification of operating records.
- Physical Security - restricting access to nuclear
materials at the site of use.
- Containment and Surveillance - use of seals,
automatic cameras and other instruments to detect
unreported movement or tampering with nuclear materials,
as well as spot checks on-site.
All NPT non-weapons states must accept these full-scope
safeguards. In the five weapons states plus the non-NPT
states (
India,
Pakistan and
Israel), facility-specific safeguards apply. IAEA
inspectors regularly visit these facilities to verify
completeness and accuracy of records.
The terms of the NPT cannot be enforced by the IAEA
itself, nor can nations be forced to sign the treaty. In
reality, as shown in Iraq and North Korea, safeguards can
be backed up by diplomatic, political and economic
measures.
Iraq and
North Korea illustrate both the strengths and
weaknesses of international safeguards. While accepting
safeguards at declared facilities, Iraq had set up
elaborate equipment elsewhere in an attempt to enrich
uranium to weapons grade. North Korea attempted to use
research reactors (not commercial electricity-generating
reactors) and a reprocessing plant to produce some
weapons-grade plutonium.
The weakness of the NPT regime lay in the fact that no
obvious diversion of material was involved. The uranium
used as fuel probably came from indigenous sources, and
the nuclear facilities concerned were built by the
countries themselves without being declared or placed
safeguards arrangements. Iraq, as an NPT party, was
obliged to declare all facilities but did not do so. In
North Korea, the activities concerned took place before
the conclusion of its NPT safeguards agreement.
Nevertheless, the activities were detected and brought
under control using international diplomacy. In Iraq, a
military defeat assisted this process. With North Korea,
possibly posed the most intractable situation confronted
by the IAEA. But significant compensation in the promised
provision of commercial power reactors eventually helped
resolve the situation.
So, while traditional safeguards easily verified the
correctness of formal declarations by suspect states, in
the
1990s attention turned to what might not have been
declared, outside the known materials flows and
facilities.
In
1993 a program was initiated to strengthen and extend
the classical safeguards system was initiated, and a model
protocol was agreed by the IAEA Board of Governors in
1997. The measures boosted the IAEA's ability to
detect undeclared nuclear activities, including those with
no connection to the civil fuel cycle.
Innovations were of two kinds. Some could be
implemented on the basis of IAEA's existing legal
authority through safeguards agreements and inspections.
Others required further legal authority to be conferred
through an Additional Protocol. This must be agreed by
each non-weapons state with IAEA, as a supplement to any
existing comprehensive safeguards agreement. Weapons
states have agreed to accept the principles of the model
additional protocol.
Key elements of the model Additional Protocol:
- The IAEA is to be given considerably more
information on nuclear and nuclear-related activities,
including R & D, production of uranium and thorium
(regardless of whether it is traded) and nuclear-related
imports and exports.
- IAEA inspectors will have greater rights of access.
This will include any suspect location, it can be at
short notice (eg. two hours), and the IAEA can deploy
environmental sampling and remote monitoring techniques
to detect illicit activities.
- States must streamline administrative procedures so
that IAEA inspectors get automatic visa renewal and can
communicate more readily with IAEA headquarters. All
these elements focus on nuclear materials. They enhance
the IAEA's ability to provide assurances that all
nuclear activities and material in the country concerned
has been declared for safeguards purposes.
- Further evolution of safeguards is towards
evaluation of each state, taking account of its
particular situation and the kind of nuclear materials
it has. This will involve greater judgement on the part
of IAEA and the development of effective methodologies
which reassure NPT States.
The greatest risk of nuclear weapons proliferation lies
with countries which have not joined the NPT and which
have significant unsafeguarded nuclear activities. India,
Pakistan and Israel are in this category. While safeguards
apply to some of their activities, others remain beyond
scrutiny.
IAEA safeguards together with bilateral safeguards
applied under the NPT can, and do, ensure that uranium
supplied by countries such as Australia and Canada does
not contribute to that proliferation. In fact the
worldwide application of those safeguards and the
substantial world trade in uranium for nuclear electricity
make the proliferation of nuclear weapons much less
likely.
The Additional Protocol, once it is widely in force
(currently 54 states have signed it and 18 have ratified
it), will provide credible assurance that there are no
undeclared nuclear materials or activities in the states
concerned. This will be a major step forward in preventing
nuclear proliferation.
In May
1995, NPT parties reaffirmed their commitment to a
Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty to prohibit the
production of any further fissile material for weapons.
This aims to complement the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty agreed in
1996 and to codify commitments made by USA, UK, France
and Russia to cease production of weapons material, as
well as putting a similar ban on China. This treaty will
also put more pressure on Israel, India and Pakistan to
agree to international verification.
Another initiative relates to plutonium (Pu) and spent
fuel. For uranium, safeguards take account of its nature:
natural, depleted, low-enriched or high-enriched (above
20% U-235) and the corresponding degree of concern
regarding proliferation. A similarly differentiated
approach is being considered for Pu. Two or three
categories are possible: degraded Pu (eg in high-burnup
fuel), low-grade Pu (eg separated from spent fuel of
normal burnup) and high-grade Pu (eg from weapons or
low-burnup fuel). The first two correspond to what is
generally known as a reactor-grade Pu, sometimes defined
as having more than 19% non-fissile isotopes.
There are also several other treaties and arrangements
designed to reduce the risk of civil nuclear power's
contributing to weapons proliferation.
Implementation of IAEA safeguards in the 13 non-nuclear
weapon states of the EU is governed by a Verification
Agreement between the country concerned,
EURATOM[?] and the IAEA. Safeguards activities are
carried out jointly by the IAEA and EURATOM. A revision to
earlier arrangements, the New Partnership Approach (NPA),
was agreed in April
1992. The NPA enables the IAEA itself to deploy more
of its resources in member states where independent
regional safeguards systems are not in place.
Shortly after entry into force of the NPT, multilateral
consultations on nuclear export controls led to the
establishment of two separate mechanisms for dealing with
nuclear exports: the Zangger Committee in
1971 and the
Nuclear Suppliers Group[?] (NSG) in
1975.
The
Zangger Committee, also known as the Non Proliferation
Treaty Exporters Committee was set up to consider how
procedures for exports of nuclear material and equipment
related to NPT commitments. In August
1974 the committee produced a trigger list of items
which would require the application of IAEA safeguards if
exported to a non Nuclear Weapons State which was not
party to the NPT. The trigger list is regularly updated.
The Zangger Committee now has 31 member states.
The NSG, also known as the
London Group[?] or
London Suppliers Group[?], was set up in 1974 after
India exploded its first nuclear device. The main reason
for the group's formation was to bring in France, a major
nuclear supplier nation which was not then party to the
NPT. It included both members and non-members of the
Zangger Committee. The group communicated its guidelines,
essentially a set of export rules, to the IAEA in
1978. These were to ensure that transfers of nuclear
material or equipment would not be diverted to
unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive
activities, and formal government assurances to this
effect were required from recipients. The Guidelines also
recognised the need for physical protection measures in
the transfer of sensitive facilities, technology and
weapons-usable materials, and strengthened retransfer
provisions. The NSG began with seven members -- the
USA, the former
USSR, the
UK,
France,
Germany,
Canada and
Japan - but now includes 35 countries.
Iraq
Up to the late
1980s it was generally assumed that any undeclared
nuclear activities would have to be based on the diversion
of nuclear material from safeguards. States acknowledged
the possibility of nuclear activities entirely separate
from those covered by safeguards, but it was assumed they
would be detected by national intelligence activities.
There was no particular effort requiring the IAEA to
attempt to detect them.
The Iraqi regime had been making efforts to secure a
nuclear potential since the 1960s. In the late 1970s a
specialised plant,
Osiraq, was constructed near Baghdad. The plant was
attacked during the
Iran-Iraq War and was destoryed in a pre-emptive
strike by Israeli bombers in June, 1981.
Not until the
1990 NPT Review Conference did some states raise the
possibility of making more use of (for example) provisions
for "special inspections" in existing NPT Safeguards
Agreements. Special inspections can be undertaken at
locations other than those where safeguards routinely
apply, if there is reason to believe there may be
undeclared material or activities.
However, inspections in Iraq following the UN
Gulf War cease-fire resolution showed the extent of
Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons program, it became
clear that the IAEA would have to broaden the scope of its
activities. Iraq was an NPT Party, and had thus agreed to
place all its nuclear material under IAEA safeguards. But
the inspections revealed that it had been pursuing an
extensive clandestine uranium enrichment program, as well
as a nuclear weapons design program.
The main thrust of Iraq's uranium enrichment program
was the development of technology for
electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) of
indigenous uranium. This uses the same principles as a
mass spectrometer (albeit on a much larger scale). Ions of
uranium-238 and uranium-235 are separated because they
describe arcs of different radii when they move through a
magnetic field. This process was used in the
Manhattan Project to make the highly enriched uranium
used in the
Hiroshima bomb, but was abandoned soon afterwards.
The Iraqis did the basic research work at their nuclear
research establishment at Tuwaitha, near Baghdad, and were
building two full-scale facilities at Tarmiya and Ash
Sharqat, north of Baghdad. However, when the war broke
out, only a few separators had been installed at Tarmiya,
and none at Ash Sharqat.
The Iraqis were also very interested in centrifuge
enrichment, and had been able to acquire some components
including some carbon-fibre rotors, which they were at an
early stage of testing.
They were clearly in violation of their NPT and
safeguards obligations, and the IAEA Board of Governors
ruled to that effect. The
UN Security Council then ordered the IAEA to remove,
destroy or render harmless Iraq's nuclear weapons
capability. This was done by mid
1998, but Iraq then ceased all cooperation with the
UN, so the IAEA withdrew from this work.
The revelations from Iraq provided the impetus for a
very far-reaching reconsideration of what safeguards are
intended to achieve.
North Korea
In contrast, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
(DPRK) provides an example of safeguards succeeding in
their aim of detecting a violation of safeguards
obligations. It was subsequently brought to the attention
of the international community through the UN Security
Council.
The DPRK acceded to the NPT in
1985 as a condition for the supply of a nuclear power
station by the then USSR. However, it delayed concluding
its NPT Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, a process
which should take only 18 months, until April
1992.
During that period, it brought into operation a small
gas-cooled, graphite-moderated, natural-uranium (metal)
fuelled "Experimental Power Reactor" of about 25
MWt. It exhibited all the features of a plutonium
production reactor for weapons purposes and produced only
about 5
MWe. North Korea also made substantial progress in the
construction of two larger reactors designed on the same
principles, a prototype of about 200 MWt (50 MWe), and a
full-scale version of about 800 MWt (200 MWe).
In addition it completed and commissioned a
reprocessing plant for the extraction of plutonium from
spent reactor fuel. That plutonium, if the fuel was only
irradiated to a very low burn-up, would have been in a
form very suitable for weapons. Although all these
facilities at
Yongbyon[?] were to be under safeguards, there was
always the risk that at some stage, the DPRK would
withdraw from the NPT on some pretext and use the
plutonium for weapons.
One of the first steps in applying NPT safeguards is
for the IAEA to verify the initial stocks of uranium and
plutonium to ensure that all the nuclear material in the
country have been declared for safeguards purposes. While
undertaking this work in
1992, IAEA inspectors found discrepancies which
indicated that the reprocessing plant had been used more
often than the DPRK had declared. This suggested that the
DPRK could have weapons-grade plutonium which it had not
declared to the IAEA. Information passed to the IAEA by a
Member State (as required under the IAEA's Statute)
supported that suggestion by indicating that the DPRK had
two undeclared waste or other storage sites.
In February
1993 the IAEA called on the DPRK to allow special
inspections of the two sites so that the initial stocks of
nuclear material could be verified. The DPRK refused, and
on 12 March announced its intention to withdraw from the
NPT (three months notice is required). In April
1993 the IAEA Board concluded that the DPRK was in
non-compliance with its safeguards obligations and
reported the matter to the UN Security Council. In June
1993 the DPRK announced that it had "suspended" its
withdrawal from the NPT, but subsequently claimed a
"special status" with respect to its safeguards
obligations. This was rejected by IAEA.
Once the DPRK's non-compliance had been reported to the
UN Security Council, the essential part of the IAEA's
mission had been completed. Inspections in the DPRK
continued, although inspectors were increasingly hampered
in what they were permitted to do by the DPRK's claim of a
"special status". However, some 8,000 corroding fuel rods
associated with the experimental reactor have remained
under close surveillance.
Following bilateral negotiations between DPRK and the
USA, and the conclusion of the agreed framework in October
1994, the IAEA has been given additional
responsibilities. The agreement requires a freeze on the
operation and construction of the DPRK's plutonium
production reactors and their related facilities, and the
IAEA is responsible for monitoring the freeze until the
facilities are eventually dismantled. The DPRK remains
uncooperative with the IAEA verification work and has yet
to comply with its safeguards agreement.
Iraq was defeated in a war, which gave the UN the
opportunity to seek out and destroy its nuclear weapons
program as part of the cease-fire conditions. The DPRK was
not defeated, nor was it vulnerable to other measures,
such as trade sanctions. It can scarcely afford to import
anything, and sanctions on vital commodities, such as oil,
would either be ineffective, or risk provoking war.
Ultimately, the DPRK was persuaded to stop what
appeared to be its nuclear weapons program in exchange,
under the agreed framework, for about $US5 billion in
energy-related assistance. This included two 1000 MWe
light water nuclear power reactors based on an advanced US
System-80 design. there was also the prospect of
diplomatic and economic relations with the USA.
South Africa
One further case of attempted nuclear weapons
proliferation should be mentioned. Here, the state
concerned had a nuclear power program producing nearly 10%
of the country's electricity, whereas Iraq and North Korea
only had research reactors.
In
1991, South Africa acceded to the NPT, concluded a
comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and
submitted a report on its nuclear material subject to
safeguards. However, the IAEA's initial verification task
was complicated by South Africa's announcement that
between
1979 and
1989 it built and then dismantled a number of nuclear
weapons. The IAEA was asked by South Africa to verify the
conclusion of its weapons program.
In
1995 the IAEA was able to declare that it was
satisfied all materials were accounted for and the weapons
program had been terminated and dismantled.
India and
Pakistan (with
Israel) have been "threshold" countries in terms of
the international non-proliferation regime, possessing, or
quickly capable of assembling one or more nuclear weapons.
Their nuclear weapons capability at the technological
level was recognised (all have research reactors at least)
along with their military ambitions, and all remained
outside the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),
which 186 nations have now signed. They are thus largely
excluded from trade in nuclear plant or materials, except
for safety-related devices for a few safeguarded
facilities.
In May
1998 India and Pakistan each exploded several nuclear
devices underground. This heightened concerns regarding an
arms race between them, with
Pakistan involving
China, an acknowledged nuclear weapons state. Both
countries are opposed to the NPT as it stands, and
India has consistently attacked the Treaty since its
inception in 1970.
Relations between the two countries are tense and
hostile, and the risks of nuclear conflict between them
have long been considered quite high.
Kashmir is a prime cause of bilateral tension, its
sovereignty being in dispute since
1948. There is persistent low level military conflict
due to Pakistan backing a
Muslim rebellion there.
Both engaged in a conventional arms race in the
1980s, including sophisticated technology and
equipment capable of delivering nuclear weapons. In the
1990s the arms race quickened. In
1994 India reversed a four-year trend of reduced
allocations for defence and despite its much smaller
economy, Pakistan was expected to push its own
expenditures yet higher. Both have lost their patrons:
India, the former USSR, and Pakistan, the United States.
But it is the growth and modernisation of China's
nuclear arsenal and its assistance with Pakistan's nuclear
power programme and, reportedly, with missile technology,
which exacerbate Indian concerns. In particular, Pakistan
is aided by China's
People's Liberation Army, which operates somewhat
autonomously within that country as an exporter of
military material.
India
Nuclear power for civil use is well established in
India. Its civil nuclear strategy has been directed
towards complete independence in the nuclear fuel cycle,
necessary because of its outspoken rejection of the NPT.
This self-sufficiency extends from uranium exploration and
mining through fuel fabrication, heavy water production,
reactor design and construction, to reprocessing and waste
management. It has a small fast breeder reactor and is
planning a much larger one. It is also developing
technology to utilise its abundant resources of thorium as
a nuclear fuel.
It has 14 small nuclear power reactors in commercial
operation, two larger ones under construction and ten more
planned. The 14 operating ones (2548 MWe total) comprise:
- two 150 MWe BWRs from USA, which started up in 1969,
now use locally-enriched uranium and are under
safeguards,
- two small Canadian PHWRs (1972 & 1980), also under
safeguards, and
- ten local PHWRs based on Canadian designs, two of
150 and eight 200 MWe.
The two under construction and two of the planned ones
are 450 MWe versions of these 200 MWe domestic products.
Construction has been seriously delayed by financial and
technical problems. In 2001 a final agreement was signed
with Russia for the country's first large nuclear power
plant, comprising two VVER-1000 reactors, under a
Russian-financed US$ 3 billion contract. The first unit is
due to be commissioned in 2007. A further two Russian
units are under consideration for the site. Nuclear power
supplied 3.1% of India's electricity in 2000 and this is
expected to reach 10 per cent by 2005. Its industry is
largely without IAEA safeguards, though a few plants (see
above) are under facility-specific safeguards.
As a result India's nuclear power program proceeds
largely without fuel or technological assistance from
other countries. Its power reactors have been among the
worst-performing in the world (re capacity factors),
reflecting the technical difficulties of the country's
isolation, but are apparently now improving significantly.
Its weapons material appears to come from a
Canadian-designed 40MW "research" reactor which started up
in 1960 (well before the NPT), and a 100MW indigenous unit
in operation since 1985, both using local uranium (India
does not import any nuclear fuel). It is estimated that
India may have built up enough weapons-grade plutonium for
a hundred nuclear warheads.
The country has at least three other research reactors
including the tiny one which is exploring the use of
thorium as a nuclear fuel, by breeding fissile U-233. In
addition, an advanced heavy-water thorium cycle is under
development.
India exploded a nuclear device in 1974 which it has
consistently claimed was for peaceful purposes. Others saw
it as a response to China's nuclear weapons capability. It
was then universally perceived, notwithstanding official
denials, to possess, or to be able to quickly assemble,
nuclear weapons. In 1997 it deployed its own medium-range
missile and is now developing a long-range missile capable
of reaching targets in China's industrial heartland.
In
1995 the USA quietly intervened to head off a proposed
nuclear test. The latest tests are unambiguously military,
including one claimed to be of a sophisticated
thermonuclear device, and their declared purpose is "to
help in the design of nuclear weapons of different yields
and different delivery systems".
Indian security policies are driven by:
- its determination to be recognised as the dominant
power in the region;
- its increasing concern with China's expanding
nuclear weapons and missile delivery programs; and
- its obsession with Pakistan, with its presumed
nuclear weapons capability and now the clear capability
to deliver such weapons deep into India.
It perceives nuclear weapons as a cost-effective
political counter to China's nuclear and conventional
weaponry, and the effects of its nuclear weapons policy in
provoking Pakistan is, by some accounts, considered
incidental. India has had an unhappy relationship with
China. Soundly defeated by China in the
1962 war, relations were frozen until
1998. Since then a degree of high-level contact has
been established and a few elementary confidence-building
measures put in place. China still occupies some Indian
territory. Its nuclear weapon and missile support for
Pakistan however is currently a major bone of contention
Pakistan
In Pakistan, nuclear power is insignificant in terms of
total energy production and requirements, supplying only
1.7% of the country's electricity. It has one small (125
MWe) Canadian PHWR nuclear power reactor from
1971 which is under international safeguards, and a
300 MWe PWR supplied by China under safeguards, which
started up in May 2000. A third one, a Chinese PWR, is
planned. Enriched fuel for the PWRs will be imported from
China.
It also has a 9 MW research reactor of
1965 vintage, and despite denials there are persistent
reports of another "multipurpose" reactor, a 50 MW PHWR
near
Khushab[?], which is presumed to have potential for
producing weapons plutonium.
Pakistan's concentration is on weapons technology,
particularly the production of highly enriched uranium
suitable for nuclear weapons, utilising indigenous
uranium. It has at least one small centrifuge enrichment
plant. In
1990 the US Administration cut off aid because it was
unable to certify that Pakistan was not pursuing a policy
of manufacturing nuclear weapons, though this was relaxed
late in
2001. In
1996 USA froze export loans to China because it was
allegedly supplying centrifuge enrichment technology to
Pakistan. Indian opinion is in no doubt about Pakistan's
nuclear weapons capability.
Pakistan has made it clear since early 1996 that if
India staged a nuclear test, it had done the basic
development work and would immediately start assembling
its own nuclear explosive device. It is assumed to now
have enough highly-enriched uranium for up to 40 nuclear
warheads.
In April
1998 Pakistan test fired a long-range missile capable
of reaching
Madras in southern India, pushing home the point by
naming it after a
12th century Muslim conqueror. This development
removed India's main military advantage over Pakistan.
Pakistan's security concerns derive from India's
possession of a nuclear weapons capability, its
development of short and intermediate-range missiles and,
since their partition in 1947, its defeat by India in two
of three wars, notably in East Bengal, now Bangladesh.
NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL IN THE REGION
The public stance of the two states on
non-proliferation differs markedly. If anything, Pakistan
appears to have dominated a continuing propaganda debate.
Pakistan has initiated a series of regional security
proposals. It has repeatedly proposed a nuclear free zone
in South Asia and has proclaimed its willingness to engage
in nuclear disarmament and to sign the Non-Proliferation
Treaty if India would do so. It has endorsed a United
States proposal for a regional five power conference to
consider non-proliferation in South Asia.
India has taken the view that solutions to regional
security issues should be found at the international
rather than the regional level, since its chief concern is
with China. It therefore rejects Pakistan's proposals.
Instead, the 'Gandhi
Plan[?]', put forward in
1988, proposed the revision of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, which it regards correctly as inherently
discriminatory in favour of the nuclear-weapon States, and
a timetable for complete nuclear weapons disarmament. It
endorsed early proposals for a Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty and for an international convention to ban the
production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for
weapons purposes, known as the 'cut-off' convention.
The United States has, for some years, and more
vigorously under the Clinton administration, pursued a
variety of initiatives to persuade India and Pakistan to
abandon their nuclear weapons programs and to accept
comprehensive international safeguards on all their
nuclear activities. To this end the Clinton administration
has proposed a conference of nine states, comprising the
five nuclear-weapon States, Japan, Germany, India and
Pakistan.
This and previous similar proposals have been spurned
by Indian observers. India countered with demands that
other potential weapons states, such as Iran and North
Korea, should be invited, and that regional limitations
would only be acceptable if they were accepted equally by
China. The USA would not accept the participation of Iran
and North Korea and such initiatives have lapsed.
Another, more recent approach, centres on the concept
of containment, designed to 'cap' the production of
fissile material for weapons purposes, which would
hopefully be followed by 'roll back'. To this end India
and the United States jointly sponsored a UN General
Assembly resolution in 1993 calling for negotiations for a
'cut-off' convention. Should India and Pakistan join such
a convention, they would have to agree to halt the
production of fissile materials for weapons and to accept
international verification on their relevant nuclear
facilities (enrichment and reprocessing plants). In short,
their weapons programs would be thus 'capped'. It appears
that India is now prepared to join negotiations regarding
such a Cut-off Treaty, under the UN Conference on
Disarmament.
Bilateral confidence-building measures between India
and Pakistan to reduce the prospects of confrontation have
been limited. In 1990 each side ratified a treaty not to
attack the other's nuclear installations, and at the end
of 1991 they provided one another with a list showing the
location of all their nuclear plants, even though the
respective lists were regarded as not being wholly
accurate. Early in 1994 India proposed a bilateral
agreement for a 'no first use' of nuclear weapons and an
extension of the 'no attack' treaty to cover civilian and
industrial targets as well as nuclear installations.
Having promoted the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty since 1954, India
dropped its support in 1995 and in 1996 attempted to block
the Treaty. Following the 1998 tests the question has been
reopened and both Pakistan and India have indicated their
intention to sign the CTBT. Indian ratification may be
conditional upon the five weapons states agreeing to
specific reductions in nuclear arsenals. The UN Conference
on Disarmament has also called upon both countries "to
accede without delay to the Non-Proliferation Treaty",
presumably as non-weapons states.
Both India and Pakistan will have noted that the
agreement between the United States and North Korea over
the future of its nuclear program shows that would-be
nuclear weapons states can be handsomely rewarded for
nuclear intransigence. It is clear that some political
figures in India and Pakistan perceive the North Korean
Agreement as an exercise in successful blackmail against
western powers. Hence India is certain to use its
increased leverage to political effect internationally, as
the world comes to terms with a new, declared nuclear
weapons state.
Israel
Israel is also thought to possess an arsenal of
potentially up to several hundred nuclear warheads, but
this has never been openly confirmed.
An Israeli nuclear installation is located about ten
kilometers to the south of
Dimona, the
Negev Nuclear Research Center[?]. Its construction
commmenced in
1958, with
French assistance. The official reason given by the
Israeli and French governments was to build a nuclear
reactor to power a "desalination plant", in order to
"green the Negev". The purpose of Dimona is widely assumed
to be the manufacturing of nuclear weapons, and the
majority of defence experts have concluded that it does in
fact do that. However, the Israeli government refuses to
confirm or deny this publicly, a policy it refers to as
"ambiguity".
When the
United States intelligence community discovered the
purpose of Dimona in the early 1960s, it demanded that
Israel agree to international inspections. Israel agreed,
but on a condition that US, rather than IAEA, inspectors
were used, and that Israel would receive advanced notice
of all inspections.
Some claim that because Israel knew the schedule of the
inspectors' visits, it was able to hide the alleged
purpose of the site (manufacturing of nuclear weapons)
from the inspectors, by installing temporary false walls
and other devices before each inspection. The inspectors
eventually informed the U.S. government that their
inspections were useless, due to Israeli restrictions on
what areas of the facility they could inspect. In
1969, the United States terminated the inspections.
In
1986,
Mordechai Vanunu, a former technican at Dimona,
revealed to the media some evidence of Israel's nuclear
program. Israeli agents kidnapped him from Italy, drugged
him and transported him to Israel, and an Israeli court
then tried him in secret on charges of
treason and
espionage, and sentenced him to eighteen years
imprisonment.
See also:
nuclear disarmament,
nuclear weapon,
nuclear reactor,
nuclear warfare,
United Nations,
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
