TROTSKYISM OR LENINISM?
by
J. V. Stalin
Speech Delivered at the Plenum
of
the Communist Group in the A.U.C.C.T.U. November
19, 1924 Pravda, No. 269, November 26,
1924 Transcribed for the Internet by Carl
Kavanagh
CONTENTS:
-
The Facts About The October Uprising
-
The Party And The Preparation For October
-
Trotskyism Or Leninism?
Notes
Comrades, after Kamenev's
comprehensive report there is little left for me to say. I shall
therefore confine myself to exposing certain legends that are being
spread by Trotsky and his supporters about the October uprising, about
Trotsky's role in the uprising, about the Party and the preparation for
October, and so forth. I shall also touch upon Trotskyism as a peculiar
ideology that is incompatible with Leninism, and upon the Party's tasks
in connection with Trotsky's latest literary pronouncements.
I.
THE FACTS ABOUT THE OCTOBER UPRISING
First of all about the October uprising. Rumours
are being vigorously spread among members of the Party that the Central
Committee as a whole was opposed to an uprising in October 1917. The
usual story is that on October 10, when the Central Committee adopted
the decision to organise the uprising, the majority of the Central
Committee at first spoke against an uprising, but, so the story runs, at
that moment a worker burst in on the meeting of the Central Committee
and said: "You are deciding against an uprising, but I tell
you that there will be an uprising all the same, in spite of
everything." And so, after that threat, the story runs, the Central
Committee, which is alleged to have become frightened, raised the
question of an uprising afresh and adopted a decision to organise it.
This is not merely a rumour, comrades. It is related by the
well-known John Reed in his book Ten Days. Reed was remote from
our Party and, of course, could not know the history of our secret
meeting on October 10, and, consequently, he was taken in by the gossip
spread by people like Sukhanov. This story was later passed round and
repeated in a number of pamphlets written by Trotskyites, including one
of the latest pamphlets on October written by Syrkin. These rumours have
been strongly supported in Trotsky's latest literary pronouncements.
It scarcely needs proof that all these and similar "Arabian
Nights" fairy tales are not in accordance with the truth, that in
fact nothing of the kind happened, nor could have happened, at the
meeting of the Central Committee. Consequently, we could ignore these
absurd rumours; after all, lots of rumours are fabricated in the office
rooms of the oppositionists or those who are remote from the Party.
Indeed, we have ignored them till now; for example, we paid no attention
to John Reed's mistakes and did not take the trouble to rectify them.
After Trotsky's latest pronouncements, however, it is no longer possible
to ignore such legends, for attempts are being made now to bring up our
young people on them and, unfortunately, some results have already been
achieved in this respect. In view of this, I must counter these absurd
rumours with the actual facts. I take the minutes of the meeting
of the Central Committee of our Party on October 10 (23), 1917. Present
Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Stalin, Trotsky, Sverdlov, Uritsky,
Dzerzhinsky, Kollontai, Bubnov, Sokolnikov, Lomov. The question of the
current situation and the uprising was discussed. After the discussion,
Comrade Lenin's resolution on the uprising was put to the vote. The
resolution was adopted by a majority of 10 against 2. Clear, one would
think: by a majority of 10 against 2, the Central Committee decided to
proceed with the immediate, practical work of organising the uprising.
At this very same meeting the Central Committee elected a political
centre to direct the uprising; this centre, called the Political Bureau,
consisted of Lenin, Zinoviev, Stalin, Kamenev, Trotsky, Sokolnikov and
Bubnov. Such are the facts. These minutes at one stroke
destroy several legends. They destroy the legend that the majority on
the Central Committee was opposed to an uprising. They also destroy the
legend that on the question of the uprising the Central Committee was on
the verge of a split. It is clear from the minutes that the opponents of
an immediate uprising -- Kamenev and Zinoviev -- were elected to the
body that was to exercise political direction of the uprising on a par
with those who were in favour of an uprising. There was no question of a
split, nor could there be. Trotsky asserts that in October our
Party had a Right wing in the persons of Kamenev and Zinoviev, who, he
says, were almost Social-Democrats. What one cannot understand then is
how, under those circumstances, it could happen that the Party avoided a
split; how it could happen that the disagreements with Kamenev and
Zinoviev lasted only a few days; how it could happen that, in spite of
those disagreements, the Party appointed these comrades to highly
important posts, elected them to the political centre of the uprising,
and so forth. Lenin's implacable attitude towards Social-Democrats is
sufficiently well-known in the Party; the Party knows that Lenin would
not for a single moment have agreed to have Social-Democratically-minded
comrades in the Party, let alone in highly important posts. How, then,
are we to explain the fact that the Party avoided a split? The
explanation is that in spite of the disagreements, these comrades were
old Bolsheviks who stood on the common ground of Bolshevism. What was
that common ground? Unity of views on the fundamental questions: the
character of the Russian revolution, the driving forces of the
revolution, the role of the peasantry, the principles of Party
leadership, and so forth. Had there not been this common ground, a split
would have been inevitable. There was no split, and the disagreements
lasted only a few days, because, and only because, Kamenev and Zinoviev
were Leninists, Bolsheviks. Let us now pass to the legend about
Trotsky's special role in the October uprising. The Trotskyites are
vigorously spreading rumours that Trotsky inspired and was the sole
leader of the October uprising. These rumours are being spread with
exceptional zeal by the so-called editor of Trotsky's works, Lentsner.
Trotsky himself, by consistently avoiding mention of the Party, the
Central Committee and the Petrograd Committee of the Party, by saying
nothing about the leading role of these organisation, in the uprising
and vigorously pushing himself forward as the central figure in the
October uprising, voluntarily or involuntarily helps to spread the
rumours about the special role he is supposed to have played in the
uprising. I am far from denying Trotsky's undoubtedly important role in
the uprising. I must say, however, that Trotsky did not play any special
role in the October uprising, nor could he do so; being chairman of the
Petrograd Soviet, he merely carried out the will of the appropriate
Party bodies, which directed every step that Trotsky took. To
philistines like Sukhanov, all this may seem strange, but the facts, the
true facts, wholly and fully confirm what I say. Let us take the
minutes of the next meeting of the Central Committee, the one held on
October 16 (29), 1917. Present: the members of the Central Committee,
plus representatives of the Petrograd Committee, plus representatives of
the military organisation, factory committees, trade unions and the
railwaymen. Among those present, besides the members of the Central
Committee, were: Krylenko, Shotman, Kalinin, Volodarsky, Shlyapnikov,
Lacis, and others, twenty-five in all. The question of the uprising was
discussed from the purely practical-organisational aspect. Lenin's
resolution on the uprising was adopted by a majority of 20 against 2,
three abstaining. A practical centre was elected for the
organisational leadership of the uprising. Who was elected to this
centre? The following five: Sverdlov, Stalin, Dzerzhinsky, Bubnov,
Uritsky. The functions of the practical centre: to direct all the
practical organs of the uprising in conformity with the directives of
the Central Committee. Thus, as you see, something "terrible"
happened at this meeting of the Central Committee, i.e., "strange
to relate," the "inspirer," the "chief figure,"
the "sole leader" of the uprising, Trotsky, was not elected to
the practical centre, which was called upon to direct the uprising. How
is this to be reconciled with the current opinion about Trotsky's
special role? Is not all this somewhat "strange," as Sukhanov,
or the Trotskyites, would say? And yet, strictly speaking, there is
nothing strange about it, for neither in the Party, nor in the October
uprising, did Trotsky play any special role, nor could he do so,
for he was a relatively new man in our Party in the period of October.
He, like all the responsible workers, merely carried out the will of the
Central Committee and of its organs. Whoever is familiar with the
mechanics of Bolshevik Party leadership will have no difficulty in
understanding that it could not be otherwise: it would have been enough
for Trotsky to have gone against the will of the Central Committee to
have been deprived of influence on the course of events. This talk about
Trotsky's special role is a legend that is being spread by obliging
"Party" gossips. This, of course, does not mean that the
October uprising did not have its inspirer. It did have its inspirer and
leader, but this was Lenin, and none other than Lenin, that same Lenin
whose resolutions the Central Committee adopted when deciding the
question of the uprising, that same Lenin who, in spite of what Trotsky
says, was not prevented by being in hiding from being the actual
inspirer of the uprising. It is foolish and ridiculous to attempt now,
by gossip about Lenin having been in hiding, to obscure the indubitable
fact that the inspirer of the uprising was the leader of the Party, V.
I. Lenin. Such are the facts. Granted, we are told, but it
cannot be denied that Trotsky fought well in the period of October. Yes,
that is true, Trotsky did, indeed, fight well in October; but Trotsky
was not the only one who fought well in the period of October. Even
people like the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, who then stood side by
side with the Bolsheviks, also fought well. In general, I must say that
in the period of a victorious uprising, when the enemy is isolated and
the uprising is growing, it is not difficult to fight well. At such
moments even backward people become heroes. The proletarian
struggle is not, however, an uninterrupted advance, an unbroken chain of
victories. The proletarian struggle also has its trials, its defeats.
The genuine revolutionary is not one who displays courage in the period
of a victorious uprising, but one who, while fighting well during the
victorious advance of the revolution, also displays courage when the
revolution is in retreat, when the proletariat suffers defeat; who does
not lose his head and does not funk when the revolution suffers
reverses, when the enemy achieves success; who does not become
panic-stricken or give way to despair when the revolution is in a period
of retreat. The Left Socialist-Revolutionaries did not fight badly in
the period of October, and they supported the Bolsheviks. But who does
not know that those "brave" fighters became panic-stricken in
the period of Brest, when the advance of German imperialism drove them
to despair and hysteria. It is a very sad but indubitable fact that
Trotsky, who fought well in the period of October, did not, in the
period of Brest, in the period when the revolution suffered temporary
reverses, possess the courage to display sufficient staunchness at that
difficult moment and to refrain from following in the footsteps of the
Left Socialist-Revolutionaries. Beyond question, that moment was a
difficult one; one had to display exceptional courage and imperturbable
coolness not to be dismayed, to retreat in good time, to accept peace in
good time, to withdraw the proletarian army out of range of the blows of
German imperialism, to preserve the peasant reserves and, after
obtaining a respite in this way, to strike at the enemy with renewed
force. Unfortunately, Trotsky was found to lack this courage and
revolutionary staunchness at that difficult moment. In Trotsky's
opinion, the principal lesson of the proletarian revolution is "not
to funk" during October. That is wrong, for Trotsky's assertion
contains only a particle of the truth about the lessons of the
revolution. The whole truth about the lessons of the proletarian
revolution is "not to funk" not only when the revolution is advancing,
but also when it is in retreat, when the enemy is gaining the upper hand
and the revolution is suffering reverses. The revolution did not end
with October. October was only the beginning of the proletarian
revolution. It is bad to funk when the tide of insurrection is rising;
but it is worse to funk when the revolution is passing through severe
trials after power has been captured. To retain power on the morrow of
the revolution is no less important than to capture power. If Trotsky
funked during the period of Brest, when our revolution was passing
through severe trials, when it was almost a matter of "surrendering"
power, he ought to know that the mistakes committed by Kamenev and
Zinoviev in October are quite irrelevant here. That is how matters
stand with the legends about the October uprising.
II.
THE PARTY AND THE PREPARATION
FOR OCTOBER
Let us now pass to the question of the
preparation for October. Listening to Trotsky, one might think
that during the whole of the period of preparation, from March to
October, the Bolshevik Party did nothing but mark time; that it was
being corroded by internal contradictions and hindered Lenin in every
way; that, had it not been for Trotsky, nobody knows how the October
Revolution would have ended. It is rather amusing to hear this strange
talk about the Party from Trotsky, who declares in this same
"preface" to Volume III that "the chief instrument of the
proletarian revolution is the Party," that "without the Party,
apart from the Party, by-passing the Party, with a substitute for the
Party, the proletarian revolution cannot be victorious." Allah
himself would not understand how our revolution could have succeeded if
"its chief instrument" proved to be useless, while success was
impossible, as it appears, "by-passing the Party." But this is
not the first time that Trotsky treats us to oddities. It must be
supposed that this amusing talk about our Party is one of Trotsky's
usual oddities. Let us briefly review the history of the
preparation for October according to periods. 1) The period
of the Party's new orientation (March-April). The major facts of
this period:
a) the overthrow of tsarism; b) the formation of
the Provisional Government (dictatorship of the bourgeoisie); c)
the appearance of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies
(dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry); d) dual
power; e) the April demonstration; f) the
first crisis of power.
The characteristic feature of this period is the fact that there existed
together, side by side and simultaneously, both the dictatorship of the
bourgeoisie and the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry; the
latter trusts the former, believes that it is striving for peace,
voluntarily surrenders power to the bourgeoisie and thereby becomes an
appendage of the bourgeoisie. There are as yet no serious conflicts
between the two dictatorships. On the other hand, there is the
"Contact Committee." [1] This was the
greatest turning point in the history of Russia and an unprecedented
turning point in the history of our Party. The old, pre-revolutionary
platform of direct overthrow of the government was clear and definite,
but it was no longer suitable for the new conditions of the struggle. It
was now no longer possible to go straight out for the overthrow of the
government, for the latter was connected with the Soviets, then under
the influence of the defencists, and the Party would have had to wage
war against both the government and the Soviets, a war that would have
been beyond its strength. Nor was it possible to pursue a policy of
supporting the Provisional Government, for it was the government of
imperialism. Under the new conditions of the struggle, the Party had to
adopt a new orientation. The Party (its majority) groped its way towards
this new orientation. It adopted the policy of pressure on the
Provisional Government through the Soviets on the question of peace and
did not venture to step forward at once from the old slogan of the
dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry to the new slogan of power
to the Soviets. The aim of this halfway policy was to enable the Soviets
to discern the actual imperialist nature of the Provisional Government
on the basis of the concrete questions of peace, and in this way to
wrest the Soviets from the Provisional Government. But this was a
profoundly mistaken position, for it gave rise to pacifist illusions,
brought grist to the mill of defencism and hindered the revolutionary
education of the masses. At that time I shared this mistaken position
with other Party comrades and fully abandoned it only in the middle of
April, when I associated myself with Lenin's theses. A new orientation
was needed. This new orientation was given to the Party by Lenin, in his
celebrated April Theses. [2] I shall not deal with
these theses, for they are known to everybody. Were there any
disagreements between the Party and Lenin at that time? Yes, there were.
How long did these disagreements last? Not more than two weeks. The City
Conference of the Petrograd organisation [3] (in the
latter half of April), which adopted Lenin's theses, marked a turning
point in our Party's development. The All-Russian April Conference [4]
(at the end of April) merely completed on an all-Russian scale the work
of the Petrograd Conference, rallying nine-tenths of the Party around
this united Party position. Now, seven years later, Trotsky gloats
maliciously over the past disagreements among the Bolsheviks and depicts
them as a struggle waged as if there were almost two parties within
Bolshevism. But, firstly, Trotsky disgracefully exaggerates and inflates
the matter, for the Bolshevik Party lived through these disagreements
without the slightest shock. Secondly, our Party would be a caste and
not a revolutionary party if it did not permit different shades of
opinion in its ranks. Moreover, it is well known that there were
disagreements among us even before that, for example, in the period of
the Third Duma, but they did not shake the unity of our Party. Thirdly,
it will not be out of place to ask what was then the position of
Trotsky himself, who is now gloating so eagerly over the past
disagreements among the Bolsheviks. Lentsner, the so-called editor of
Trotsky's works, assures us that Trotsky's letters from America (March)
"wholly anticipated" Lenin's Letters From Afar [5]
(March), which served as the basis of Lenin's April Theses. That is what
he says: "wholly anticipated." Trotsky does not object to this
analogy; apparently, he accepts it with thanks. But, firstly, Trotsky's
letters "do not in the least resemble" Lenin's letters either
in spirit or in conclusions, for they wholly and entirely reflect
Trotsky's anti-Bolshevik slogan of "no tsar, but a workers'
government," a slogan which implies a revolution without the
peasantry. It is enough to glance through these two series of letters to
be convinced of this. Secondly, if what Lentener says is true, how are
we to explain the fact that Lenin on the very next day after his arrival
from abroad considered it necessary to dissociate himself from Trotsky?
Who does not know of Lenin's repeated statements that Trotsky's slogan:
"no tsar, but a workers' government" was an attempt
"to skip the still unexhausted peasant movement," that this
slogan meant "playing at the seizure of power by a workers'
government"? * What can there be in common
between Lenin's Bolshevik theses and Trotsky's anti-Bolshevik scheme
with its "playing at the seizure of power"? And what prompts
this passion that some people display for comparing a wretched hovel
with Mont Blanc? For what purpose did Lentsner find it necessary to make
this risky addition to the heap of old legends about our revolution of
still another legend, about Trotsky's letters from America
"anticipating" Lenin's well-known Letters From Afar? **
No wonder it is said that an obliging fool is more dangerous than
an enemy. 2) The period of the revolutionary mobilisation of
the masses (May-August). The major facts of this period:
a) the April demonstration in Petrograd and the formation of
the coalition government with the participation of
"Socialists"; b) the May Day demonstrations in
the principal centres of Russia with the slogan of "a democratic
peace"; c) the June demonstration in Petrograd with
the principal slogan: "Down with the capitalist ministers!";
d) the June offensive at the front and the reverses of
the Russian army; e) the July armed demonstration in
Petrograd; the Cadet ministers resign from the government; f)
counter-revolutionary troops are called in from the front; the
editorial offices of Pravda are wrecked; the counter-revolution
launches a struggle against the Soviets and a new coalition government
is formed, headed by Kerensky; g) the Sixth Congress of
our Party, which issues the slogan to prepare for an armed uprising;
h) the counter-revolutionary Conference of State and the
general strike in Moscow; i) Kornilov's unsuccessful
march on Petrograd, the revitalising of the Soviets; the Cadets resign
and a "Directory" is formed.
The characteristic feature of this period is the intensification of the
crisis and the upsetting of the unstable equilibrium between the Soviets
and the Provisional Government which, for good or evil, had existed in
the preceding period. Dual power has become intolerable for both sides.
The fragile edifice of the "Contact Committee" is tottering.
"Crisis of power" and "ministerial re-shuffle" are
the most fashionable catchwords of the day. The crisis at the front and
the disruption in the rear are doing their work, strengthening the
extreme flanks and squeezing the defencist compromisers from both sides.
The revolution is mobilising, causing the mobilisation of the
counter-revolution. The counter-revolution, in its turn, is spurring on
the revolution, stirring up new waves of the revolutionary tide. The
question of transferring power to the new class becomes the immediate
question of the day. Were there disagreements in our Party then?
Yes, there were. They were, however, of a purely practical character,
despite the assertions of Trotsky, who is trying to discover a
"Right" and a "Left" wing in the Party. That is to
say, they were such disagreements as are inevitable where there is
vigorous Party life and real Party activity. Trotsky is wrong in
asserting that the April demonstration in Petrograd gave rise to
disagreements in the Central Committee. The Central Committee was
absolutely united on this question and condemned the attempt of a group
of comrades to arrest the Provisional Government at a time when the
Bolsheviks were in a minority both in the Soviets and in the army. Had
Trotsky written the "history" of October not according to
Sukhanov, but according to authentic documents, he would easily have
convinced himself of the error of his assertion. Trotsky is
absolutely wrong in asserting that the attempt, "on Lenin's
initiative," to arrange a demonstration on June 10 was described as
"adventurism" by the "Rightwing" members of the
Central Committee. Had Trotsky not written according to Sukhanov he
would surely have known that the June 10 demonstration was postponed
with the full agreement of Lenin, and that he urged the necessity of
postponing it in a big speech he delivered at the well-known meeting of
the Petrograd Committee (see minutes of the Petrograd Committee [6]).
Trotsky is absolutely wrong in speaking about "tragic"
disagreements in the Central Committee in connection with the July armed
demonstration. Trotsky is simply inventing in asserting that some
members of the leading group in the Central. Committee "could not
but regard the July episode as a harmful adventure." Trotsky, who
was then not yet a member of our Central Committee and was merely our
Soviet parliamentary, might, of course, not have known that the Central
Committee regarded the July demonstration only as a means of sounding
the enemy, that the Central Committee (and Lenin) did not want to
convert, did not even think of converting, the demonstration into an
uprising at a time when the Soviets in the capitals still supported the
defencists. It is quite possible that some Bolsheviks did whimper over
the July defeat. I know, for example, that some of the Bolsheviks who
were arrested at the time were even prepared to desert our ranks. But to
draw inferences from this against certain alleged "Rights,"
alleged to be members of the Central Committee, is a shameful distortion
of history. Trotsky is wrong in declaring that during the Kornilov
days a section of the Party leaders inclined towards the formation of a
bloc with the defencists, towards supporting the Provisional Government.
He, of course, is referring to those same alleged "Rights" who
keep him awake at night. Trotsky is wrong, for there exist documents,
such as the Central Organ of the Party of that time, which refute his
statements. Trotsky refers to Lenin's letter to the Central Committee
warning against supporting Kerensky; but Trotsky fails to understand
Lenin's letters, their significance, their purpose. In his letters,
Lenin sometimes deliberately ran ahead, pushing into the forefront
mistakes that might possibly be committed, and criticising them
in advance with the object of warning the Party and of safeguarding it
against mistakes. Sometimes he would even magnify a "trifle"
and "make a mountain out of a molehill" for the same
pedagogical purpose. The leader of the party, especially if he is in
hiding, cannot act otherwise, for he must see further than his
comrades-in-arms, he must sound the alarm over every possible mistake,
even over "trifles." But to infer from such letters of Lenin's
(and he wrote quite a number of such letters) the existence of
"tragic" disagreements and to trumpet them forth means not to
understand Lenin's letters, means not to know Lenin. This, probably,
explains why Trotsky sometimes is wide of the mark. In short: there were
no disagreements in the Central Committee during the Kornilov revolt,
absolutely none. After the July defeat, disagreement did indeed
arise between the Central Committee and Lenin on the question of the
future of the Soviets. It is known that Lenin, wishing to concentrate
the Party's attention on the task of preparing the uprising outside the
Soviets, warned against any infatuation with the latter, for he was of
the opinion that, having been defiled by the defencists, they had become
useless. The Central Committee and the Sixth Party Congress took a more
cautious line and decided that there were no grounds for excluding the
possibility that the Soviets would revive. The Kornilov revolt showed
that this decision was correct. This disagreement, however, was of no
great consequence for the Party. Later, Lenin admitted that the line
taken by the Sixth Congress had been correct. It is interesting that
Trotsky has not clutched at this disagreement and has not magnified it
to "monstrous" proportions. A united and solid party,
the hub of the revolutionary mobilisation of the masses -- such was the
picture presented by our Party in that period. 3) The period
of organisation of the assault (September-October). The major
facts of this period:
a) the convocation of the Democratic Conference and the
collapse of the idea of a bloc with the Cadets; b) the
Moscow and Petrograd Soviets go over to the side of the Bolsheviks;
c) the Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region [7];
the Petrograd Soviet decides against the withdrawal of the troops;
d) the decision of the Central Committee on the uprising
and the formation of the Revolutionary Military Committee of the
Petrograd Soviet; e) the Petrograd garrison decides to
render the Petrograd Soviet armed support; a network of commissars of
the Revolutionary Military Committee is organised; f) the
Bolshevik armed forces go into action; the members of the Provisional
Government are arrested; g) the Revolutionary Military
Committee of the Petrograd Soviet takes power; the Second Congress of
Soviets sets up the Council of People's Commissars.
The characteristic feature of this period is the rapid growth of the
crisis, the utter consternation reigning among the ruling circles, the
isolation of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, and the mass
flight of the vacillating elements to the side of the Bolsheviks. A
peculiar feature of the tactics of the revolution in this period must be
noted, namely, that the revolution strove to take every, or nearly
every, step in its attack in the guise of defence. Undoubtedly, the
refusal to allow the troops to be withdrawn from Petrograd was an
important step in the revolution's attack; nevertheless, this attack was
carried out under the slogan of protecting Petrograd from possible
attack by the external enemy. Undoubtedly, the formation of the
Revolutionary Military Committee was a still more important step in the
attack upon the Provisional Government; nevertheless, it was carried out
under the slogan of organising Soviet control over the actions of the
Headquarters of the Military Area. Undoubtedly, the open transition of
the garrison to the side of the Revolutionary Military Committee and the
organisation of a network of Soviet Commissars marked the beginning of
the uprising; nevertheless, the revolution took these steps under the
slogan of protecting the Petrograd Soviet from possible action by the
counterrevolution. The revolution, as it were, masked its actions in
attack under the cloak of defence in order the more easily to draw the
irresolute, vacillating elements into its orbit. This, no doubt,
explains the outwardly defensive character of the speeches, articles and
slogans of that period, the inner content of which, none the less, was
of a profoundly attacking nature. Were there disagreements in the
Central Committee in that period? Yes, there were, and fairly important
ones at that. I have already spoken about the disagreements over the
uprising. They are fully reflected in the minutes of the meetings of the
Central Committee of October 10 and 16. I shall, therefore, not repeat
what I have already said. Three questions must now be dealt with:
participation in the Pre-parliament, the role of the Soviets in the
uprising, and the date of the uprising. This is all the more necessary
because Trotsky, in his zeal to push himself into a prominent place, has
"inadvertently" misrepresented the stand Lenin took on the
last two questions. Undoubtedly, the disagreements on the question
of the Pre-parliament were of a serious nature. What was, so to speak,
the aim of the Pre-parliament? It was: to help the bourgeoisie to push
the Soviets into the background and to lay the foundations of bourgeois
parliamentarism. Whether the Pre-parliament could have accomplished this
task in the revolutionary situation that had arisen is another matter.
Events showed that this aim could not be realised, and the
Pre-parliament itself was a Kornilovite abortion. There can be no doubt,
however, that it was precisely this aim that the Mensheviks and
Socialist-Revolutionaries pursued in setting up the Pre-parliament. What
could the Bolsheviks' participation in the Pre-parliament mean under
those circumstances? Nothing but deceiving the proletarian masses about
the true nature of the Pre-parliament. This is the chief explanation for
the passion with which Lenin, in his letters, scourged those who were in
favour of taking part in the Pre-parliament. There can be no doubt that
it was a grave mistake to have taken part in the Pre-parliament. It
would be a mistake, however, to think, as Trotsky does, that those who
were in favour of taking part in the Pre-parliament went into it for the
purpose of constructive work, for the purpose of "directing the
working-class movement" "into the channel of
Social-Democracy." That is not at all the case. It is not true. Had
that been the case, the Party would not have been able to rectify this
mistake "in two ticks" by demonstratively walking out of the
Pre-parliament. Incidentally, the swift rectification of this mistake
was an expression of our Party's vitality and revolutionary might.
And now, permit me to correct a slight inaccuracy that has crept
into the report of Lentsner, the "editor" of Trotsky's works,
about the meeting of the Bolshevik group at which a decision on the
question of the Pre-parliament was taken. Lentsner says that there were
two reporters at this meeting, Kamenev and Trotsky. That is not true.
Actually, there were four reporters: two in favour of boycotting the
Pre-parliament (Trotsky and Stalin), and two in favour of participation
(Kamenev and Nogin). Trotsky is in a still worse position when
dealing with the stand Lenin took on the question of the form of the
uprising. According to Trotsky, it appears that Lenin's view was that
the Party should take power in October "independently of and behind
the back of the Soviet." Later on, criticising this nonsense, which
he ascribes to Lenin, Trotsky "cuts capers" and finally
delivers the following condescending utterance: "That would
have been a mistake." Trotsky is here uttering a falsehood about
Lenin, he is misrepresenting Lenin's views on the role of the Soviets in
the uprising. A pile of documents can be cited, showing that Lenin
proposed that power be taken through the Soviets, either the
Petrograd or the Moscow Soviet, and not behind the back of the
Soviets. Why did Trotsky have to invent this more than strange legend
about Lenin? Nor is Trotsky in a better position when he
"analyses" the stand taken by the Central Committee and Lenin
on the question of the date of the uprising. Reporting the famous
meeting of the Central Committee of October 10, Trotsky asserts that at
that meeting "a resolution was carried to the effect that the
uprising should take place not later than October 15." From this it
appears that the Central Committee fixed October 15 as the date of the
uprising and then itself violated that decision by postponing the date
of the uprising to October 25. Is that true? No, it is not. During that
period the Central Committee passed only two resolutions on the uprising
-- one on October 10 and the other on October 16. Let us read these
resolutions. The Central Committee's resolution of October 10:
"The Central Committee recognises that the international position
of the Russian revolution (the mutiny in the German navy, which is an
extreme manifestation of the growth throughout Europe of the world
socialist revolution, and the threat of peace ***
between the imperialists with the object of strangling the revolution
in Russia) as well as the military situation (the indubitable decision
of the Russian bourgeoisie and Kerensky and Co. to surrender Petrograd
to the Germans), and the fact that the proletarian party has gained a
majority in the Soviets -- all this, taken in conjunction with the
peasant revolt and the swing of popular confidence towards our Party
(the elections in Moscow), and, finally, the obvious preparations
being made for a second Kornilov affair (the withdrawal of troops from
Petrograd, the dispatch of Cossacks to Petrograd, the surrounding of
Minsk by Cossacks, etc.) -- all this places an armed uprising on the
order of the day. "Considering, therefore, that an armed
uprising is inevitable, and that the time for it is fully ripe, the
Central Committee instructs all Party organisations to be guided
accordingly, and to discuss and decide all practical questions (the
Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region, the withdrawal of troops
from Petrograd, the actions of the people in Moscow and Minsk, etc.)
from this point of view." [8]
The resolution adopted by the conference of the Central Committee with
responsible workers on October 16:
"This meeting fully welcomes and wholly supports the Central
Committee's resolution, calls upon all organisations and all workers
and soldiers to make thorough and most intense preparations for an
armed uprising and for support of the centre set up by the Central
Committee for this purpose, and expresses complete confidence that the
Central Committee and the Soviet will in good time indicate the
favourable moment and the suitable means for launching the
attack." [9]
You see that Trotsky's memory betrayed him about the date of the
uprising and the Central Committee's resolution on the uprising. Trotsky
is absolutely wrong in asserting that Lenin underrated Soviet legality,
that Lenin failed to appreciate the great importance of the All-Russian
Congress of Soviets taking power on October 25, and that this was the
reason why he insisted that power be taken before October 25. That is
not true. Lenin proposed that power be taken before October 25 for two
reasons. Firstly, because the counter-revolutionaries might have
surrendered Petrograd at any moment, which would have drained the blood
of the developing uprising, and so every day was precious. Secondly,
because the mistake made by the Petrograd Soviet in openly fixing
and announcing the day of the uprising (October 25) could not be
rectified in any other way than by actually launching the uprising before
the legal date set for it. The fact of the matter is that Lenin regarded
insurrection as an art, and he could not help knowing that the enemy,
informed about the date of the uprising (owing to the carelessness of
the Petrograd Soviet) would certainly try to prepare for that day.
Consequently, it was necessary to forestall the enemy, i.e., without
fail to launch the uprising before the legal date. This is the
chief explanation for the passion with which Lenin in his letters
scourged those who made a fetish of the date -- October 25. Events
showed that Lenin was absolutely right. It is well known that the
uprising was launched prior to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets. It
is well known that power was actually taken before the opening of the
All-Russian Congress of Soviets, and it was taken not by the Congress of
Soviets, but by the Petrograd Soviet, by the Revolutionary Military
Committee. The Congress of Soviets merely took over power from
the Petrograd Soviet. That is why Trotsky's lengthy arguments about the
importance of Soviet legality are quite beside the point. A virile and
mighty party standing at the head of the revolutionary masses who were
storming and overthrowing bourgeois rule -- such was the state of our
Party in that period. That is how matters stand with the legends about
the preparation for October.
III.
TROTSKYISM OR LENINISM?
We have dealt above with the legends directed
against the Party and those about Lenin spread by Trotsky and his
supporters in connection with October and the preparation for it. We
have exposed and refuted these legends. But the question arises: For
what purpose did Trotsky need all these legends about October and the
preparation for October, about Lenin and the Party of Lenin? What is the
purpose of Trotsky's new literary pronouncements against the Party? What
is the sense, the purpose, the aim of these pronouncements now, when the
Party does not want a discussion, when the Party is busy with a host of
urgent tasks, when the Party needs united efforts to restore our economy
and not a new struggle around old questions? For what purpose does
Trotsky need to drag the Party back, to new discussions? Trotsky
asserts that all this is needed for the purpose of "studying"
October. But is it not possible to study October without giving another
kick at the Party and its leader Lenin? What sort of a
"history" of October is it that begins and ends with attempts
to discredit the chief leader of the October uprising, to discredit the
Party, which organised and carried through the uprising? No, it is not a
matter here of studying October. That is not the way to study
October. That is not the way to write the history of October.
Obviously, there is a different "design" here, and everything
goes to show that this "design" is that Trotsky by his
literary pronouncements is making another (yet another!) attempt to
create the conditions for substituting Trotskyism for Leninism. Trotsky
needs "desperately" to discredit the Party, and its cadres who
carried through the uprising, in order, after discrediting the Party, to
proceed to discredit Leninism. And it is necessary for him to discredit
Leninism in order to drag in Trotskyism as the "sole"
"proletarian" (don't laugh!) ideology. All this, of course
(oh, of course!) under the flag of Leninism, so that the dragging
operation may be performed "as painlessly as possible. "
That is the essence of Trotsky's latest literary pronouncements.
That is why those literary pronouncements of Trotsky's sharply
raise the question of Trotskyism. And so, what is Trotskyism?
Trotskyism possesses three specific features which bring it into
irreconcilable contradiction with Leninism. What are these
features? Firstly. Trotskyism is the theory of
"permanent" (uninterrupted) revolution. But what is permanent
revolution in its Trotskyist interpretation? It is revolution that fails
to take the poor peasantry into account as a revolutionary force.
Trotsky's "permanent" revolution is, as Lenin said,
"skipping" the peasant movement, "playing at the seizure
of power." Why is it dangerous? Because such a revolution, if an
attempt had been made to bring it about, would inevitably have ended in
failure, for it would have divorced from the Russian proletariat its
ally, the poor peasantry. This explains the struggle that Leninism has
been waging against Trotskyism ever since 1905. How does Trotsky
appraise Leninism from the standpoint of this struggle? He regards it as
a theory that possesses "anti-revolutionary features." What is
this indignant opinion about Leninism based on? On the fact that, at the
proper time, Leninism advocated and upheld the idea of the dictatorship
of the proletariat and peasantry. But Trotsky does not
confine himself to this indignant opinion. He goes further and asserts:
"The entire edifice of Leninism at the present time is built on
lies and falsification and bears within itself the poisonous elements of
its own decay" (see Trotsky's letter to Chkheidze, 1913). As you
see, we have before us two opposite lines. Secondly.
Trotskyism is distrust of the Bolshevik Party principle, of the
monolithic character of the Party, of its hostility towards opportunist
elements. In the sphere of organisation, Trotskyism is the theory that
revolutionaries and opportunists can co-exist and form groups and
coteries within a single party. You are, no doubt, familiar with the
history of Trotsky's August bloc, in which the Martovites and Otzovists,
the Liquidators and Trotskyites, happily co-operated, pretending that
they were a "real" party. It is well known that this patchwork
"party" pursued the aim of destroying the Bolshevik Party.
What was the nature of "our disagreements" at that time? It
was that Leninism regarded the destruction of the August bloc as a
guarantee of the development of the proletarian party, whereas
Trotskyism regarded that bloc as the basis for building a
"real" party. Again, as you see, we have two opposite
lines. Thirdly. Trotskyism is distrust of the
leaders of Bolshevism, an attempt to discredit, to defame them. I do not
know of a single trend in the Party that could compare with Trotskyism
in the matter of discrediting the leaders of Leninism or the central
institutions of the Party. For example, what should be said of Trotsky's
"polite" opinion of Lenin, whom he described as "a
professional exploiter of every kind of backwardness in the Russian
working-class movement"? (ibid.) And this is far from being
the most "polite" of the "polite" opinions Trotsky
has expressed. How could it happen that Trotsky, who carried such
a nasty stock-in-trade on his back, found himself, after all, in the
ranks of the Bolsheviks during the October movement? It happened because
at that time Trotsky abandoned (actually did abandon) that
stock-in-trade; he hid it in the cupboard. Had he not performed that
"operation," real co-operation with him would have been
impossible. The theory of the August bloc, i.e., the theory of unity
with the Mensheviks, had already been shattered and thrown overboard by
the revolution, for how could there be any talk about unity when an
armed struggle was raging between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks?
Trotsky had no alternative but to admit that this theory was useless.
The same misadventure "happened" to the theory of
permanent revolution, for not a single Bolshevik contemplated the
immediate seizure of power on the morrow of the February Revolution, and
Trotsky could not help knowing that the Bolsheviks would not allow him,
in the words of Lenin, "to play at the seizure of power."
Trotsky had no alternative but recognise the Bolsheviks' policy of
fighting for influence in the Soviets, of fighting to win over the
peasantry. As regards the third specific feature of Trotskyism (distrust
of the Bolshevik leaders), it naturally had to retire into the
background owing to the obvious failure of the first two features.
Under those circumstances, could Trotsky do anything else but hide
his stock-in-trade in the cupboard and follow the Bolsheviks,
considering that he had no group of his own of any significance, and
that he came to the Bolsheviks as a political individual, without an
army? Of course, he could not! What is the lesson to be learnt
from this? Only one: that prolonged collaboration between the Leninists
and Trotsky is possible only if the latter completely abandons his old
stock-in-trade, only if he completely accepts Leninism. Trotsky writes
about the lessons of October, but he forgets that, in addition to all
the other lessons, there is one more lesson of October, the one I have
just mentioned, which is of prime importance for Trotskyism. Trotskyism
ought to learn that lesson of October too. It is evident, however,
that Trotskyism has not learnt that lesson. The fact of the matter is
that the old stock-in-trade of Trotskyism that was hidden in the
cupboard in the period of the October movement is now being dragged into
the light again in the hope that a market will be found for it, seeing
that the market in our country is expanding. Undoubtedly, Trotsky's new
literary pronouncements are an attempt to revert to Trotskyism, to
"overcome" Leninism, to drag in, implant, all the specific
features of Trotskyism. The new Trotskyism is not a mere repetition of
the old Trotskyism; its feathers have been plucked and it is rather
bedraggled; it is incomparably milder in spirit and more moderate in
form than the old Trotskyism; but, in essence, it undoubtedly retains
all the specific features of the old Trotskyism. The new Trotskyism does
not dare to come out as a militant force against Leninism; it prefers to
operate under the common flag of Leninism, under the slogan of
interpreting, improving Leninism. That is because it is weak. It cannot
be regarded as an accident that the appearance of the new Trotskyism
coincided with Lenin's departure. In Lenin's lifetime it would not have
dared to take this risky step. What are the characteristic
features of the new Trotskyism? 1) On the question of
"permanent" revolution. The new Trotskyism does not
deem it necessary openly to uphold the theory of "permanent"
revolution. It "simply" asserts that the October Revolution
fully confirmed the idea of "permanent" revolution. From this
it draws the following conclusion: the important and acceptable part of
Leninism is the part that came after the war, in the period of the
October Revolution; on the other hand, the part of Leninism that existed
before the war, before the October Revolution, is wrong and
unacceptable. Hence, the Trotskyites' theory of the division of Leninism
into two parts: pre-war Leninism, the "old,"
"useless" Leninism with its idea of the dictatorship of the
proletariat and peasantry, and the new, post-war, October Leninism,
which they count on adapting to the requirements of Trotskyism.
Trotskyism needs this theory of the division of Leninism as a first,
more or less "acceptable" step that is necessary to facilitate
further steps in its struggle against Leninism. But Leninism is
not an eclectic theory stuck together out of diverse elements and
capable of being cut into parts. Leninism is an integral theory, which
arose in 1903, has passed the test of three revolutions, and is now
being carried forward as the battle-flag of the world proletariat.
"Bolshevism," Lenin said, "as a trend of political
thought and as a political party, has existed since 1903. Only the
history of Bolshevism during the whole period of its existence
can satisfactorily explain why it was able to build up and to maintain
under most difficult conditions the iron discipline needed for the
victory of the proletariat" (see Vol. XXV, p. 174).
Bolshevism and Leninism are one. They are two names for one and the same
thing. Hence, the theory of the division of Leninism into two parts is a
theory intended to destroy Leninism, to substitute Trotskyism for
Leninism. Needless to say, the Party cannot reconcile itself to
this grotesque theory. 2) On the question of the Party
principle. The old Trotskyism tried to undermine the Bolshevik
Party principle by means of the theory (and practice) of unity with the
Mensheviks. But that theory has suffered such disgrace that nobody now
even wants to mention it. To undermine the Party principle, present-day
Trotskyism has invented the new, less odious and almost
"democratic" theory of contrasting the old cadres to the
younger Party element. According to Trotskyism, our Party has not a
single and integral history. Trotskyism divides the history of our Party
into two parts of unequal importance: pre-October and post-October. The
pre-October part of the history of our Party is, properly speaking, not
history, but "pre-history," the unimportant or, at all events,
not very important preparatory period of our Party. The post-October
part of the history of our Party, however, is real, genuine history. In
the former, there are the "old," "pre-historic,"
unimportant cadres of our Party. In the latter there is the new, real,
"historic" Party. It scarcely needs proof that this singular
scheme of the history of the Party is a scheme to disrupt the unity
between the old and the new cadres of our Party, a scheme to destroy the
Bolshevik Party principle. Needless to say, the Party cannot
reconcile itself to this grotesque scheme. 3) On the
question of the leaders of Bolshevism. The old Trotskyism tried
to discredit Lenin more or less openly, without fearing the
consequences. The new Trotskyism is more cautious. It tries to achieve
the purpose of the old Trotskyism by pretending to praise, to exalt
Lenin. I think it is worth while quoting a few examples. The Party
knows that Lenin was a relentless revolutionary; but it knows also that
he was cautious, that he disliked reckless people and often, with a firm
hand, restrained those who were infatuated with terrorism, including
Trotsky himself. Trotsky touches on this subject in his book On Lenin,
but from his portrayal of Lenin one might think that all Lenin did was
"at every opportunity to din into people's minds the idea that
terrorism was inevitable." The impression is created that Lenin was
the most bloodthirsty of all the bloodthirsty Bolsheviks. For what
purpose did Trotsky need this uncalled for and totally unjustified
exaggeration? The Party knows that Lenin was an exemplary Party
man, who did not like to settle questions alone, without the leading
collective body, on the spur of the moment, without careful
investigation and verification. Trotsky touches upon this aspect, too,
in his book. But the portrait he paints is not that of Lenin, but of a
sort of Chinese mandarin, who settles important questions in the quiet
of his study, by intuition. Do you want to know how our Party
settled the question of dispersing the Constituent Assembly? Listen to
Trotsky:
"'Of course, the Constituent Assembly will have to be dispersed,'
said Lenin, 'but what about the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries?'
"But our apprehensions were greatly allayed by old
Natanson. He came in to 'take counsel' with us, and after the first
few words he said: "'We shall probably have to disperse the
Constituent Assembly by force.' "'Bravo!' exclaimed Lenin.
'What is true is true! But will your people agree to it?' "'Some
of our people are wavering, but I think that in the end they will
agree,' answered Natanson."
That is how history is written. Do you want to know how the Party
settled the question about the Supreme Military Council? Listen to
Trotsky:
"'Unless we have serious and experienced military experts we
shall never extricate ourselves from this chaos,' I said to Vladimir
Ilyich after every visit to the Staff. "'That is evidently
true, but they might betray us....' "'Let us attach a
commissar to each of them.' "'Two would be better,"
exclaimed Lenin, 'and strong-handed ones. There surely must be
strong-handed Communists in our ranks.' "That is how the
structure of the Supreme Military Council arose."
That is how Trotsky writes history. Why did Trotsky need these
"Arabian Nights" stories derogatory to Lenin? Was it to exalt
V. I. Lenin, the leader of the Party? It doesn't look like it. The
Party knows that Lenin was the greatest Marxist of our times, a profound
theoretician and a most experienced revolutionary, to whom any trace of
Blanquism was alien. Trotsky touches upon this aspect, too, in his book.
But the portrait he paints is not that of the giant Lenin, but of a
dwarf-like Blanquist who, in the October days, advises the Party
"to take power by its own hand, independently of and behind the
back of the Soviet." I have already said, however, that there is
not a scrap of truth in this description. Why did Trotsky need
this flagrant ... inaccuracy? Is this not an attempt to discredit Lenin
"just a little"? Such are the characteristic features of
the new Trotskyism. What is the danger of this new Trotskyism? It
is that Trotskyism, owing to its entire inner content, stands every
chance of becoming the centre and rallying point of the non-proletarian
elements who are striving to weaken, to disintegrate the proletarian
dictatorship. You will ask: what is to be done now? What are the
Party's immediate tasks in connection with Trotsky's new literary
pronouncements? Trotskyism is taking action now in order to
discredit Bolshevism and to undermine its foundations. It is the duty of
the Party to bury Trotskyism as an ideological trend. There is
talk about repressive measures against the opposition and about the
possibility of a split. That is nonsense, comrades. Our Party is strong
and mighty. It will not allow any splits. As regards repressive
measures, I am emphatically opposed to them. What we need now is not
repressive measures, but an extensive ideological struggle against
renascent Trotskyism. We did not want and did not strive for this
literary discussion. Trotskyism is forcing it upon us by its
anti-Leninist pronouncements. Well, we are ready, comrades.
NOTES
By J. V. Stalin
[*] See Lenin's Works, Vol. XX, p. 104.
See also the reports made at the Petrograd City Conference and at the
All-Russian Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) (middle and end of April,
1917). [**] Among these legends must be
included also the very widespread story that Trotsky was the
"sole" or "chief organiser" of the victories on the
fronts of the civil war. I must declare, comrades, in the interest of
truth, that this version is quite out of accord with the facts. I am far
from denying that Trotsky played an important role in the civil war. But
I must emphatically declare that the high honour of being the organiser
of our victories belongs not to individuals, but to the great collective
body of advanced workers in our country, the Russian Communist Party.
Perhaps it will not be out of place to quote a few examples. You know
that Kolchak and Denikin were regarded as the principal enemies of the
Soviet Republic. You know that our country breathed freely only after
those enemies were defeated. Well, history shows that both those
enemies, i.e., Kolchak and Denikin, were routed by our troops in
spite of Trotsky's plans. Judge for yourselves.
1) Kolchak. This is in the summer of 1919. Our troops are
advancing against Kolchak and are operating near Ufa. A meeting of the
Central Committee is held. Trotsky proposes that the advance be halted
along the line of the River Belaya (near Ufa), leaving the Urals in
the hands of Kolchak, and that part of the troops be withdrawn from
the Eastern Front and transferred to the Southern Front. A heated
debate takes place. The Central Committee disagrees with Trotsky,
being of the opinion that the Urals, with its factories and railway
network, must not be left in the hands of Kolchak, for the latter
could easily recuperate there organise a strong force and reach the
Volga again; Kolchak must first be driven beyond the Ural range into
the Siberian steppes, and only after that has been done should forces
be transferred to the South The Central Committee rejects Trotsky's
plan. Trotsky hands in his resignation. The Central Committee refuses
to accept it. Commander-in-Chief Vatsetis, who supported Trotsky's
plan, resigns. His place is taken by a new Commander-in-Chief,
Kamenev. From that moment Trotsky ceases to take a direct part in the
affairs of the Eastern Front. 2) Denikin. This is in the
autumn of 1919. The offensive against Denikin is not proceeding
successfully. The "steel ring" around Mamontov (Mamontov's
raid) is obviously collapsing. Denikin captures Kursk. Denikin is
approaching Orel. Trotsky is summoned from the Southern Front to
attend a meeting of the Central Committee. The Central Committee
regards the situation as alarming and decides to send new military
leaders to the Southern Front and to withdraw Trotsky. The new
military leaders demand "no intervention" by Trotsky in the
affairs of the Southern Front. Trotsky ceases to take a direct part in
the affairs of the Southern Front.. Operations on the Southern Front,
right up to the capture of Rostov-on-Don and Odessa by our troops,
proceed without Trotsky.
Let anybody try to refute these facts. [***]
Obviously, this should be "a separate peace." -- J. St.
NOTES
From SW
[1] The "Contact Committee,"
consisting of Chkheidze, Steklov, Sukhanov, Filippovsky and Skobelev
(and later Chernov and Tsereteli), was set up by the Menshevik and
SocialistRevolutionary Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet of
Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies on March 7, 1917, for the purpose of
establishing contact with the Provisional Government, of
"influencing" it and "controlling" its activities.
Actually, the "Contact Committee" helped to carry out the
bourgeois policy of the Provisional Government and restrained the masses
of the workers from waging an active revolutionary struggle to transfer
all power to the Soviets. The "Contact Committee" existed
until May 1917, when representatives of the Mensheviks and
Socialist-Revolutionaries entered the provisional Government. [2]
See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ea., Vol. 24, pp. 17. [3]
The Petrograd City Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) took place from
April 27 to May 5 (April 14-22), 1917, with 57 delegates present. V. I.
Lenin and J. V. Stalin took part in the proceedings. V. I. Lenin
delivered a report on the current situation based on his April Theses.
J. V. Stalin was elected to the commission for drafting the resolution
on V. I. Lenin's report. [4] Concerning
the Seventh AllRussian April Conference of the Bolshevik Party see the History
of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course, Moscow 1952, pp. 291-96. [5]
See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ea., Vol. 23, pp. 289-333.
[6] See "Speech by V. I. Lenin at the
Meeting of the Petrograd Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.), June 24 (11),
1917, Concerning the Cancelling of the Demonstration" (Works,
4th Russ. ea., Vol. 25, pp. 62-63). [7]
The Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies of the
Northern Region took place in Petrograd on October 24-26 (11-13), 1917,
under the direction of the Bolsheviks. Representatives were present from
Petrograd, Moscow, Kronstadt, Novgorod, Reval, Helsingfors, Vyborg and
other cities. In all there were 94 delegates, of whom 51 were
Bolsheviks. The congress adopted a resolution on the need for immediate
transference of all power to the Soviets, central and local. It called
upon the peasants to support the struggle for the transference of power
to the Soviets and urged the Soviets themselves to commence active
operations and to set up Revolutionary Military Committees for
organising the military defence of the revolution. The congress set up a
Northern Regional Committee and instructed it to prepare for the
convocation of the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets and to
co-ordinate the activities of all the Regional Soviets. [8]
See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ea., Vol. 26. [9]
See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ea.. Vol. 26.
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